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Abstract
A quantum protocol for secure transmission of data using qubits is presented. This protocol sends one qubit in a
round-trip to transmit one bit of data. The protocol offers
an improvement over the BB84 QKD protocol. BB84, in
conjunction with one-time pad encryption, has been shown
to be unconditionally secure. However its security relies
on the assumption that the qubit source device does not
emit multiple replicas of the same qubit for each transmitted bit. If this happens a multi-qubit emission attack can be
launched. In addition, BB84 cannot be used to send predetermined bit strings as it generates a random bit string
in the process. Our protocol does not have the above drawbacks, but requires an authenticated public channel in order
to detect an intruder, in the way as BB84. Our protocol does
not require a shared secret key.

1. Introduction
Since the publication of the BB84 protocol [1], a growing class of quantum cryptographic protocols has emerged.
BB84 and its variants [3, 6] aim at providing perfect security in transferring classical data between two parties. However, these protocols are key establishment protocols rather
than data transfer protocols. They provide ultimate data
security by generating a random sequence of bit which is
shared between Alice and Bob. The sequence is then used
as a one-time pad or as a symmetric key. Because this sequence is generated in the process of protocol execution, it
cannot be known in advance. This can be a drawback in
applications where a predeﬁned sequence of bits is to be
distributed securely. Our protocol can be used to avoid this
drawback. Also, though expensive, in some applications it
may be justiﬁable to use the quantum channel to send conﬁdential data as opposed to using the classical channel. Our
protocol can be used in those situations as well.

Saied Hosseini-Khayat
College of Information Technology
University of Wollongong (Dubai Campus)
Dubai, U.A.E.
saiedkhayat@uowdubai.ac.ae

It has been shown that BB84 is unconditionally secure
[2, 4]. However this fact depends on the assumption that
the qubit source does not emit multiple replicas of the same
qubit. In BB84, Alice generates a sequence of qubits which
have been chosen at random from one of two predeﬁned
bases. She then sends a random sequence of bits using
those qubits. Bob makes measurement on the qubits upon
receipt and then waits for the basis information from Alice. The basis information comes through a public authenticated channel. If the qubit source emits multiple replicas
for each intended qubit, an eavesdropper (Eve) on the quantum channel can capture and preserve the qubits until the
basis is announced by Alice. At that time, Eve can perform
measurement in the correct basis and obtain the bits send
by Alice. This is called a multi-qubit emission attack. Our
protocol is not vulnerable to this kind of attack because information crucial to correct measurement of the qubits is
not transmitted or broadcast.
In our protocol, as in BB84 and other key exchange protocols, the availability of an authenticated (though not private) channel is an indispensable element. This channel is
the very essential means by which Bob can identify Alice
and differentiates her from Eve. In key exchange protocols
without an authenticated channel, Eve can launch a successful man-in-the-middle attack. In our protocol, qubits are exchanged between Alice and Bob, and they must make sure
that the qubits are not altered or inserted by Eve. An authenticated channel is required for them to ensure this.
Our protocol has two major advantages over BB84 (explained above), but it comes at a cost: The qubits must make
a round trip instead of a one-way trip. At a time when sending qubits over long distances is a technical challenge, this
requirement may sound too troublesome. However, there
is a trade-off: A round trip must be weighted against the
challenge of making a single-qubit source.
This paper is organized as follows: In the next section,
we present the key ideas and properties used in our protocol.
Then in Section 3, the proposed protocols are presented. In
Section 4, we discuss the correctness and security of our
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protocol. At last in Section 5, we summarize the results of
our paper. In the interest of space, the proofs of propositions
are placed in the appendix as they are technicalities that may
be skipped in the ﬁrst reading.

2. Preliminaries
In this paper, we have borrowed some key concepts from
BB84. One key concept which is not from BB84 is the following: Suppose Bob wants to send one bit to Alice. Alice
sends a random bit to Bob and she remembers this bit. Bob
performs an exclusive-or between Alice’s bit and his bit and
sends the result to back Alice. Alice can recover Bob’s bit.
This is perfectly secure if Eve cannot inspect Alice’s bit on
the way to Bob. If Eve inspects the bit being sent from Bob
to Alice, she will not know Bob’s bit. Of course, we should
also prevent the possibility of a man-in-the-middle attack
by Eve. It is hard to realize the above idea in classical cryptography. However, in quantum cryptography this can be
realized at least in one way that is presented in this paper.
The whole idea of quantum cryptography revolves
around the concept of a qubit. A qubit |ψ is a quantum
state vector in a two dimensional Hilbert space H2 . A qubit
can be measured with respect to any given basis in H2 . In
quantum computation, the basis {|0, |1} is called the computational basis. Measuring a qubit |ψ = a|0+b|1 in the
computational basis will change it to |0 or |1 with probabilities |a|2 and |b|2 , respectively. The observed outcome is
logic value ’0’ with probability |a|2 or logic value ’1’ probability |b|2 . Hereafter, whenever a qubit is ”measured”, we
mean it is measured in the computational basis.
In protocols discussed in this paper, Alice and Bob rotate qubits around a known ﬁxed axis in the Bloch sphere
[7, page 15]. Without loss of generality and for the sake
of convenience, we choose this axis to be the y-axis. To
perform a rotation around the y-axis by an angle θ, a given
qubit |ψ must be operated upon by the following operator:


cos θ2 − sin θ2
.
R(θ) =
sin θ2
cos θ2
It is easy to verify that for all angles α, β and θ, the following statements hold:
R(α)R(β) = R(β)R(α) = R(α + β),
R† (θ) = R(−θ).
We will work with the following family of qubits:
θ
θ
|ψ(θ) = R(θ)|0 = cos |0 + sin |1.
2
2
Since |0 is the state vector coinciding with the unit vector
along the z-axis in the Bloch sphere, then every |ψ(θ) is a

rotated version of the qubit |0 rotated by an angle θ around
the y-axis in the xz-plane. Also be reminded that any two
qubits whose Bloch sphere representations are colinear and
point in opposite directions, e.g. |ψ(θ) and |ψ(θ + π), are
orthogonal to each other and hence they can be detected and
distinguished with perfect certainty.
Suppose |ψ(θ) is known by Alice to encode one of two
logic values 0 or 1. If she makes measurement in the computational basis on this qubit, she will obtain 0 with probability cos2 θ2 and will obtain 1 with probability sin2 θ2 . However if Alice knows the value of θ, and if she operates R† (θ)
on this qubit before making measurement in the computational basis, then she will obtain 0 with probability 1 (perfect certainty).
Now suppose that Alice receives |φ and she knows this
qubit is either |ψ(θ), or |ψ(θ + π). Without knowing θ, if
she makes measurement, the outcome will be 0 or 1 at random, the probability of each depending on the actual state
she received. On the other hand, if Alice knows the value of
θ, she can perform the unitary operation R† (θ)|φ and then
followed by measurement in the computational basis. With
probability one, she will obtain 0 if |φ = |ψ(θ) or obtain
1 if |φ = |ψ(θ + π). Therefore with known angle θ, the
states |ψ(θ) and |ψ(θ + π) represent 0 and 1, respectively,
and can be distinguished with perfect certainty.
In what follows, we use the random variable X to denote
the binary information transmitted, the random variable Y
to denote the binary information received by an intended
party, and the random variable Z to denote the information
bit obtained by an intruder. Adopting Shannon’s deﬁnition,
we deem a protocol as unconditionally secure if H(X|Y ) =
0 and H(X|Z) = H(X). The ﬁrst condition means that Y
reveals everything about X. The latter means that Z reveals
nothing about X; this is true if and only if X and Z are
independent.
We now prove some propositions that represent our key
ideas and will be used later. (To keep this paper within
the size limit, we have omitted the proofs of the propositions. The interested reader should consult [5] which
is available online.) Consider a set of distinct angles
{θ0 , θ1 , . . . , θn−1 }, all in [0, 2π]. Suppose Alice prepares
a qubit |ψ = R(θk + πX)|0, where θk was selected with
probability pk , and X ∈ {0, 1} is a binary random variable
(which is Alice’s data).
Proposition 1 If Alice sends the qubit to Bob. If Bob knows
θk , he can recover X without error.
Proposition 2 Alice sends the qubit to Bob. Eve, who does
not knows θk , intercepts and rotates it by an arbitrary angle of her choice −α, makes measurement on the qubit
and obtains a binary value Z. There exist a probability distribution pk and a set {θ0 , θ1 , . . . , θn−1 } such that
H(X|Z) = H(X).
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Proposition 3 Suppose Alice sends the qubit to Bob. Eve
who does not knows θk intercepts the qubit and performs a
rotation by an angle of her choice α. She then makes measurement on the qubit and then transmits the resulting qubit,
denoted |φ1 , to Bob. If Bob knows θk , and if he performs
the following unitary operation |φ2  = R† (θ)|φ1  followed
by a measurement of |φ2 , then the channel between Alice
and Bob has an error probability Prob(error) equal to:
n−1

k=0


θk
2 θk − α
2 θk − α
2 θk
cos
+ cos
sin
.
sin
2
2
2
2


pk

2

Proposition 4 In Proposition 3, suppose we set
n > 2,

pk =

1
,
n

θk =

then
Prob(error) ≥

2kπ
,
n

1
,
4

with equality when α = 0.
This proposition means that by certain choice of pk ’s and
θk ’s (as prescribed above) we can be sure that Eve’s interaction will be detected with probability at least 1/4. Also,
from the point of view of Eve, who wants to minimize her
probability of being detected, this means that her best strategy is to do measurement only without any rotations. This
result will be used in the analysis of our qubit authentication
protocol (Protocol 1).

3. Proposed Protocol
First we present a protocol for sending authenticated
qubits. Then we present a protocol for sending secure data
using authenticated qubits.

3.1. Sending Authentic Qubits
We deﬁne an authentic qubit as a qubit which has been
sent by Alice and received by Bob such that Eve has not
altered it in any way along the way. Suppose Alice wants to
send authentic qubits to Bob. For convenience, we restrict
our discussion to the family of qubits residing in the xzplane.
Protocol 1 Suppose Alice has a sequence of N qubits
|ψ1 , |ψ2 , . . . , |ψN , and wishes to send them to Bob in
an authenticated way. We assume that a classical bidirectional authenticated channel exists between Alice and Bob.
Also assumed is a set of publicly-known distinct angles
θk = 2kπ
n , k = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1.
1. Alice selects M integers uniformly at random in
{0, 1, . . . , n − 1}, denoted k1 , k2 , . . . , kM .

2. Alice creates qubits |φ1 , |φ1 , . . . , |φM , such that for
each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , M }
|φi  = R(2ki π/n) |0.
We call these the check qubits.
3. Alice generates M distinct random integers
j1 , j2 , . . . , jM in {1, 2, . . . , N + M }. She then
creates a frame of length N + M and inserts each
|φi  at location ji in the frame. Then the sequence of
qubits |ψ1 , |ψ2 , . . . , |ψN , are inserted at the empty
locations in the frame preserving their order.
4. Alice sends the frame to Bob. Bob receives the frame.
5. Alice sends the following data to Bob:
(j1 , k1 ), (j2 , k2 ), . . . , (jM , kM ).
These data are sent via the classical authenticated
channel. Eve can read these data.
6. Knowing ji ’s, Bob extracts the sequence of |φi ’s from
the frame, and for each i = 1, 2, . . . , M , he performs R† (2ki π/n)|φi . Then he measures the resulting state. The outcome must be a logical ’0’ for all
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , M }. If this condition does not hold for
any |φi , the frame is said to have an authentication
error.
7. If there is an authentication error, Bob notiﬁes Alice
and both drop the frame. Otherwise, the frame is considered unaltered and the sequence of |ψi ’s is deemed
to be authentic.
At a given level of certainty (determined by parameters
N and M ), this protocol uses a classical authenticated channel to create an authenticated quantum channel. This protocol is analyzed in Section 4. We use this protocol as a tool
to prevent the man-in-the-middle attack in our conﬁdential
data transfer protocol (Protocol 2).

3.2. Sending Conﬁdential Qubits
In this section, we present a protocol that enables sending conﬁdential data over the quantum channel. In this protocol, qubits make a round trip from Alice to Bob to Alice
and undergo a unitary operation by Bob along the way. The
protocol is described below.
Protocol 2 Suppose Bob has a sequence of N data bits
x1 , x2 , . . . , xN where xi ∈ {0, 1}. The existence of a classical bidirectional authenticated channel exists between Alice and Bob is assumed.
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1. Alice generates a sequence of random integers
k1 , k2 , . . . , kN where ki ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}. She
keeps these integers conﬁdential to herself.
2. Alice creates n qubits |ψ11 , |ψ12 , . . . , |ψ1N , such
i
that |ψ1i  = R( 2πk
n )|0.

data and sends to Bob. If Bob knows the original qubit’s
angle can recover Alice’s data. In the case of Protocol 2
(which is slightly different), it is Bob who encodes his data,
but since he does not know the qubit’s angle, he sends it
to Alice who (by the reason of Proposition 1) can recover
Bob’s data without error. Therefore, Protocol 2 is correct.

3. Alice sends the N qubits to Bob using Protocol 1.
4. Bob receives the N authenticated qubits from Alice.
On each |ψ1i , without making measurement, he performs the unitary operation R(πxi ) to produce the
qubit sequence
|ψ21 , |ψ22 , . . . , |ψ2N 
where |ψ2i  = R(πxi )|ψ1i . This sequence is sent to
Alice in an authenticated way using Protocol 1.
5. Alice receives the N authenticated qubits. On each
i
qubit |ψ2i , she perform unitary operation R† ( 2πk
n ).
The resulting sequence denoted
|ψ31 , |ψ32 , . . . , |ψ3N 
is then measured to produce bit sequence
y1 , y2 , . . . , yN . This sequence is deemed to be
the sequence sent by Bob.
As shown in Propositions 1 through 4, there seems to be
no advantage in selecting n > 3. Therefore we propose
setting n = 3 in both protocols.

4. Analysis
In this section, we analyze the two protocols to show that
they indeed serve their intended purposes. In our analysis,
we take advantage of the propositions set forward in the
preliminary section. Since our primary purpose in this paper
is introducing a protocol for conﬁdential data transfer, We
analyze Protocol 1 ﬁrst while assuming Protocol 2 serves its
purpose perfectly (i.e., sending authentic qubits).

4.1. Analysis of Protocol 2
We analyze this protocol in two steps: First we show it
is correct, second, we show it is secure.
Correctness
We show that Protocol 2 works correctly by invoking Proposition 1. Notice that Alice prepares each qubit |ψ1i  at a
i
certain angle 2πk
n which she only knows. Bob encodes his
data bit in the qubit by performing R(πxi )|ψ1i . Doing so
means that Alice’s qubit either remains the same or is rotated by an angle π. In Proposition 1, Alice encodes her

Security
We show that Protocol 2 is secure. This means that an intruder (Eve) cannot recover Bob’s data. We do this in the
following:
i
a) Note that if Eve can ﬁnd out the angle 2πk
n for each
qubit |ψ1i , she, like Alice, can recover Bob’s data.
An invocation of Proposition 2 will prove that this is
not possible.

First notice that Protocol 2 uses the speciﬁc set of pk ’s
and θk ’s that satisﬁes Proposition 2 for security. (The
values are given in [5] in Proof of Proposition 2.) Next,
notice that the ﬁrst trip of a qubit from Alice to Bob
corresponds to the same trip in Proposition 2 with the
exception that Alice’s data is set to a constant logic
’0’. Since the condition for Proposition 2 is met by our
speciﬁc choice of pk ’s and θk ’s, therefore:
Prob(Z = 0 | X = 0) = Prob(Z = 1 | X = 0) =

1
.
2

This means that when Eve (intercepts and ) measures
each |ψ1i  ( possibly after a rotation of her choice),
then she observes logic ’0’ or ’1’ with equal probabili
ity, regardless of Alice’s choice of angle 2πk
n . Therefore, she can’t get any information about the qubit’s
angle in its trip from Alice to Bob.
b) Although the conclusion in item a) is good news, note
that if there are only two angles for Alice to choose
from (i.e., n = 2) then that conclusion will break down
because Eve know Alice’s data is ’0’, and since Alice can only prepare one of the two states R(0)|0 or
R(π)|0, then Eve can ﬁnd out the angle with certainty
because the two states are orthogonal. Therefore we
have to impose the condition n > 2 for the sake of
security.
c) To show that performing Protocol 1 is essential in
the ﬁrst leg of the trip, we assume that Alice sends
the qubits to Bob without performing Protocol 1 (thus
modifying Step 3 in Protocol 2). While Eve can get no
information about the speciﬁc choice of qubit angles
by Alice, Eve is still able to launch the following manin-the-middle attack:
Eve intercepts and performs measurement on Alice’s
qubits. This allows her to know the state of each qubit
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(they will be either |0 or |1.) She then sends these
to Bob. (Or she might as well drop Alice’s qubits and
send her own.) Bob, who is not aware, encodes his
data in Eve’s qubits and send them to Alice. Eve intercepts, makes measurement (thus perfectly recovering
Bob’s data), and then sends arbitrary qubits to Alice.
Alice’s measurements (after appropriate rotations that
she knows) will produce gibberish. But Eve has managed to steal Bob’s data. Thus it is absolutely essential
that Bob knows that the qubits he receives are authentic; that is, they come from Alice without Eve having
the opportunity to intervene. This is the job of Protocol
1 (assuming it works ﬂawlessly.)
d) On the return trip for qubits (from Bob to Alice), Eve
can intercept and make measurement on the qubits.
These qubits carry data, however a direct invocation of
Proposition 2 shows that no data can be gained by Eve
if she intercepts (Apply Proposition 2). However, if
Bob does not use Protocol 1 (in Step 4) in transmitting
the qubits back to Alice, a malicious Eve can intercept,
drop the qubits and insert her own. In this case, Alice
will receive gibberish instead of meaningful data. This
is a disruption of communication as opposed to compromised security.
e) In this and the next items, we show security against
multi-qubit emission attack. Suppose a qubit source
used by Alice is imperfect and for each intended qubit
it creates multiple replicas in exactly the same state as
the original. This can create a severe security problem
in BB84: Eve can capture and preserve a replica qubit
and wait until the angle information is announced on
the public channel. She then can perform measurement in the correct basis and recover the data. This
cannot happen in Protocol 2 because no such information concerning the data carrying qubits is ever sent.
Only in Protocol 1, angle information about the check
qubits are sent on the public channel. This cannot give
away information about Bob’s data. We will deal with
the check qubits when we analyze Protocol 1.
f) Another attack using multiple qubits is the following:
In Step 3, Protocol 2, Alice sends qubits to Bob. Because of the multiple-qubit imperfection, Eve can capture and preserve a qubit replica for each original qubit
Alice sends. During the execution of protocol 1, the
check qubits are identiﬁed, therefore Eve can throw
them away. She keeps the non-check qubits which are
intended for carrying data. In the return trip, Bob sends
the data carrying qubits encoded with his data. Not
knowing the qubit’s angles, Eve cannot extract any information from the replicas she received from Alice
nor from the originals or replicas she receives from

Bob. (Now assume Protocol 1 is not perform in the
return trip at Step 4.) Eve can drop Bob’s qubits and
insert her own. These are the replicas she kept now encoded with her fake data. This data can be received and
understood by Alice. This attack affects the integrity
of data rather than its conﬁdentiality.
However, this attack cannot succeed because of using
Protocol 1 at Step 4. At Step 4, Bob sends his qubits
(|ψi ’s) along with the check qubits (|φi ’s) he inserts
in the frame. Eve who receives all these qubits has no
information about the position of these qubits. Therefore she cannot replace the non-check qubits with her
own. She can at best make a random guess about the
position of N non-check qubits and
to replace

 attempt
lucky
to sucthem. Eve must be at least 1 in N +M
N
ceed. This means that by a choice of sufﬁciently large
N and M , her luck can be made completely insigniﬁcant. Remember that these two parameters can be set
to exceed any given numbers. If necessary, an appropriate padding algorithm can extend the length N of
Bob’s data to a required minimum. Therefore, we have
justiﬁed the use of Protocol 1 in Step 4, and thus removed the possibility of using multiple-qubit attack.
Up to now, we have discussed the various ways Protocol 2 can be attacked, and have shown that none can succeed. As it was seen, the security of Protocol 1 was a key
assumption. In the next section, we turn to analyzing this
assumption.

4.2. Analysis of Protocol 1
We show that Protocol 1 allows Alice to send Bob authenticated qubits. Authenticity of these qubits are essential
for guaranteeing the security of Protocol 2. It is easy to see
that Protocol 1 works correctly if Eve is not present.
Suppose Alice sends to Bob a frame of N + M qubits
using Protocol 1. The idea is that Eve cannot interact with
the qubits with vanishing probability of being detected by
Bob. According to Propositions 3 and 4, because of the
special choice of pk ’s and θk ’s, if Eve performs a measurement (possibly after an arbitrary rotation) on any one of the
check qubits, the probability that her action produces an error detectable by Bob is at least Pe = 1/4.
Now suppose Eve decides to inspect L qubits at random
in the frame. The probability that out of L qubits, k are
check qubits is as follows:
 N M 
Prob(Eve picks k check qubits) =

L−k
M +N k
L

.

The probability that Eve goes undetected given she inspects
k check qubits is as follows:
Prob(Eve undetected | k) = (1 − Pe )k .
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Therefore the probability that Eve’s interaction is detected
when she inspects L qubits in the frame at random is:
Prob(Eve undetected when she inspects L qubits) =
L




N

M 

(1 − Pe )k L−k
M +N k .

a) It can be used to send data over the quantum channel securely. This is especially useful in key distribution applications where keys are generated in advance
rather than on the ﬂy. BB84 and its variants cannot
transfer predetermined keys.

It is easy to compute, either by using the above equation or
directly, the following extreme cases:

b) In BB84, some information leaks out, therefore a
process called privacy ampliﬁcation is required by that
protocol. In our protocol, no information about the
data leaks out.

I. Eve decides to inspect all qubits in a frame. The probability that her action is not detected is:

c) Our protocol, unlike BB84, is not vulnerable to multiqubit emission attack.

k=0

L

Prob(Eve undetected) = (1 − Pe )M .
If she succeeds, she has been able to measure all N
qubits that were supposed to be protected. This event
can be made arbitrarily improbable by increasing the
number of check qubits M .
II. Eve decides to inspect only one qubit in a frame. The
probability that her action is not detected:
Prob(Eve undetected) = 1 −

M Pe
.
N +M

If she succeeds, at best she has been able to measure
only one of the N qubits. The probability of this event
can only be made as small as (1 − Pe ) by increasing
M.
In both cases, increasing M implies decreasing the probability that Eve is not detected.
In another attack on this protocol, Eve does not measure
the qubits but attempts to replace them with her own. Suppose she wishes to send L qubits of her own. She must
choose L < N qubits in the frame to be replaced. Lack of
any knowledge about the position of check qubits makes her
guess randomly. She will be lucky if she selects
the
 Mof

 none
+N
/
.
check qubits. The probability of this event is N
L
L
This probability can be made a small as desired by choosing
a sufﬁciently large number M of check qubits. In general,
by increasing parameter M , we can make the probability
that Eve’s measurement or replacement of L qubits goes
undetected as small as desired.

5. Conclusion
We introduced and analyzed two novel quantum protocols that together allow a secure transfer of classical data
bits. The ﬁrst protocol enables Alice and Bob to exchange
authenticated qubits. The second protocol, which makes use
of the ﬁrst one, enables Alice and Bob to exchange data bits
securely. The combined protocol has the following merits:

One disadvantage of our protocol is its round trip requirement. This is a price to pay to protect against multi-qubit
emission attack. While we have discussed most probable
attack scenarios, there is more to be done to prove the unconditional security of this protocol.
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